Building a Robust Grid

A robust electrical grid plans for power generation failure. When a power plant shuts down for an emergency or for planned maintenance there must be power plants that make up the power generation lost. For this reason, many power plants do not generate the energy they are capable of - most power plants hold a reserve they use when another plant shuts down. When a power plant is permanently shutdown and not replaced, that reduces how robust the grid is.

Everyone wants there to be power during emergencies. The concept is easy to grasp. If one power plant is serving the grid and it goes down for maintenance, then the grid will be without power. To increase the robustness of the grid you'd want to have at least two power plants running at 50% capacity - so if one shuts down for emergency or repair, the other could compensate by using its reserve production. In reality, there are likely more than ten power plants on your grid and all normally operate with a 20% reserve or more - so one power plant shut down is easily accommodated. Even two power plants can shut down without a problem.

When considering how robust the grid is - grid engineers break our energy requirements down to two types of loads on the grid. Base load power and peak load power. Base load can be thought of power that is always required over a certain time frame. Peak load power can be thought of as power that is always variable over the same time frame.

Base load and peak load power terms are not terms made up by the coal and natural gas industry to try to shut renewables out of the grid. Base load power and peak load power are terms that classified power due to the generation technologies employed on the grid.

"Fast Ramp" energy generation technologies

Fast ramp power generation technologies are simply those generation technologies that can ramp up power production very quickly. Fast ramp power generation is used to satisfy peak load power. Fast ramp technologies include those technologies that can ramp up power production from a few seconds to a few hours. Fast ramp technologies are generally less efficient and more costly.

"Slow Ramp" energy generation technologies

Slow ramp power generation technologies are simply those generation technologies that are very slow to ramp up power production. Slow ramp power generation is used to satisfy peak load power. Slow ramp technologies are those technologies that take hours to days to ramp up power production. Slow ramp technologies are those technologies are generally more efficient and less costly.

"Hybrid" energy generation technologies

Hybrid technologies are those technologies that can ramp up quickly and are generally very efficient and less costly.

To produce a robust electrical grid we must have reserve capacity for both slow and fast ramp technologies to meet both base load demand and peak load demand when a power generator is shutdown.

A logical question is asked "Do we really need the "base load" and "peak load" classifications if we derive all of our energy from a "hybrid" energy generation source?" The answer is "No, we don't." Hybrid power generators can simultaneously produce both peak and base load power, making these classifications irrelevant. Unfortunately, hydropower, that is produced by hydroelectric dams, is currently the only hybrid energy generation technology on the grid.

Hydroelectric power can present its own challenges. Firstly, there are not that many places that are ideal for hydroelectric. Secondly, in the midwest, for example, portions of rivers may be dammed to produce electricity. There can be a concern with freshwater rivers in northern climates of rivers freezing over and not producing electricity. In the southwest, many rivers are dammed to create reservoirs and lakes. Unlike the midwest, these lakes are generally only replenished with water produced from a summer thaw of mountain snow. Because these lakes in the southwest are a source of drinking water, during a drought, energy production maybe greatly curtailed to save potable water.

It is very rare indeed, that an electrical grid would be entirely supplied by hydroelectric power.

However, hydroelectric power is generally very prized for its ability to produce both fast and slow ramp power to satisfy both base load and peak load power requirements.

Having a robust grid - means being able to deliver power during all types of weather conditions. For power generation, the biggest culprits in shutting down power plants are hurricanes and blizzards. For transmission, any weather event that can down power lines are a threat to the delivery of electricity.

For states like Ohio, infrastructure can play a big part in how robust a grid is. Power plants like nuclear power plants can keep up to two years of nuclear fuel in their core. Nuclear power plants are generally considered the most robust of all power plants because there are so little natural events that can affect their ability to operate.

Coal-fired power plants are generally considered the next most robust power plant because they can normally keep 1-2 months of coal onsite and only in the most extreme of situations can this coal not be burned.

Depending on where a hydroelectric power plant is situated and the technology it employs it can be equal to a coal-fired power plant in robustness. In Ohio, hydroelectric power plants are generally considered slightly less robust than coal-fired power plants.

Natural gas power plants generally have four concerns relating to robustness. Well-head freeze offs, pipeline infrastructure, earthquakes, and terrorism.

• Well-head freeze offs - Natural gas is stored underground. There is moisture in the ground and when extracting natural gas from the ground water vapor is removed with the natural gas. During extreme cold weather events this water can freeze at the well-head. Well heads can be partially or fully restricted with ice during a cold weather event. The restriction due to ice, if significant enough can lead to a pressure drop in a natural gas line - which would prevent a natural gas power plant from operating properly. A pressure drop can prevent many residential furnaces from operating properly as well.

• Pipeline infrastructure - During an extreme cold weather event residential heating and electrical power generation compete for natural gas. If the cold weather event is significant enough, there may not be enough gas being delivered due to there not being enough volume in natural gas pipelines.

• Terrorism - Natural gas pipelines are particularly susceptible to a terrorist attack. There can be a very long distance between where natural gas is stored and where it is delivered, creating multiple places for an attack. While natural gas pipelines are buried and relatively safe there are places where these pipelines are vulnerable above ground.

• Earthquakes - While natural gas pipelines are normally buried deep enough to mitigate the freeze and thaw cycles natural movement of the earth - they are not immune to the impacts of earthquakes.

Intermittent generation technologies such as wind (without complementing utility scale batteries) and solar (photovoltaic without complementing utility scale batteries) do not substantially contribute to grid robustness. To be able to play a part in buttressing and fortifying the electrical grid, a technology must be able to supply energy-on-demand. There are some renewable technologies that can provide energy-on-demand such as hydroelectric and geothermal. Even direct solar that uses a large array of mirrors to heat molten salt can aid in fortifying the grid. Unfortunately, even with subsidies most experts see reliable wind and solar being cost prohibitive in most of the United States. There are areas in the United States where wind and solar have the potential to be cost competitive but are still not reliable enough to be considered reliable in an extreme weather event.

The transmission of electricity cannot be ignored when fortifying the electrical grid. There are a myriad of decisions to be made to reinforce transmission lines, sub-transmission lines, and distribution lines.

The transmission of electricity cannot be ignored when fortifying the electrical grid. There are a myriad of decisions to be made to reinforce transmission lines, sub-transmission lines, and distribution lines.

Should electrical lines be buried or should they be placed on poles?

After a bad storm, you may see electrical lines down and wonder why power lines are not simply buried? The reason why the United States buries very few of its power lines is due to the upfront cost. Transmission lines (high-tension power lines) cost about $100,000 per mile on average to run in the United States. Buried transmission lines cost about $1,000,000 per mile on average to run in the United States (that's 10X-times the amount for buried lines). Distribution lines cost about 5X-times the amount to bury lines rather than put them on poles.

Some arguments have been made that repairs and new connections will cost more because of the time and labor in dealing with underground utilities. The reality is that there are far fewer repairs that need to be made. Long-term, it has been demonstrated that it is almost always cheaper to have above-ground lines.

Why do other countries in Europe (like Germany) bury almost all of their power lines?

Burying power lines makes sense in more densely populated areas. America is a very large country and very sparsely populated - it makes sense that you see a lot of utility poles. In some European nations, they do not have a free-market or competition with their energy grid and it is the state that runs the utility. The state can realize economies of scale when they determine that all power lines will be buried. Like in the Netherlands, the state also buries the wires for the phone and internet, this makes it more cost-effective to bury all lines at the same time. Countries that bury their electricity lines do have higher electricity bills but have much fewer problems when it comes to weather.

In states like Ohio, most power lines will be above the ground due to the cost. States like Ohio should have a taskforce to analyze if there is any strategic value to having some lines buried to avert loss of life during extreme weather events.

Cities should examine burying distribution lines. Burying lines can add significantly to the property value of the community.

State legislators are the representatives of a representative republic that are ultimately responsible for the safety of their residents during a time of terrorism or during an extreme weather event. The potential exists for mass casualties by combining a terrorist event with an extreme weather event.

Every state legislator should be wargaming and making preparations for an extreme weather event where residents are most susceptible and dependent upon the state's energy grid. State legislators should consider what would happen if terrorists decide to take advantage of such a calamity.

Can you imagine what would have happened in Ohio during the 1978 blizzard if there was an attack on Ohio's energy infrastructure? It is likely that Ohio's death rate would have been many times higher and the emergency lasted much longer.

State legislators need to question if their national guard is training for such terrorist attacks. How will power be restored in such an emergency? In Ohio, in 1978, many homes had fireplaces and still had home trash incinerators that helped many Ohioans through the blizzard - when the natural gas pipeline pressure dropped and furnaces failed to work. Today, environmental legislation has reduced the potential for backup heat sources that can be used in an emergency potentially making a 1978 blizzard much more deadly.

What preparations are being made if transmission lines are severed during a blizzard or extended cold spell? What happens if the natural gas infrastructure is attacked? How many casualties will there be? These are decisions that state legislators should be making locally and not unelected federal bureaucrats.

In 2014, Ohio experienced nearly two weeks of arctic weather. During this time, Ohio's natural gas wells had many well heads freeze shut. Electrical generation from natural gas was severely reduced and Ohio had 25 coal-fired power units at 7 power plants that kept the electricity flowing. Environmental regulations closed those 7 power plants and 25 generating units. Since 2014 Ohio has added much more natural gas and is poised to add more solar and possibly more wind power. It is very doubtful that if Ohio experiences another polar vortex today, that Ohio will weather it as well as it did in 2014.

• State legislators should work with grid engineers and modelers to determine reserve capacity goals for power plants. A capacity reserve is both a metric of grid reliability and safety in an unexpected emergency.

• State legislators should set safety and security goals for their natural gas infrastructure

• State legislators should determine what types of technologies get added to the grid. Striking a balance between the cost of energy and energy reliability is a determiner of safety during extreme weather events or terrorist attacks.

• State legislators should set goals for electrical transmission reliability during extreme weather events. It is advisable that State legislators create policies that can mitigate the severity of a terrorist attack on their transmission infrastructure.